Marquette Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 1 December 1942

Article 5

Marriage and Divorce - Judgments - Absolute or
Limited Divorce Judgments Under 247.09 of the
Wisconsin Statutes
Anthony Palasz

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Anthony Palasz, Marriage and Divorce - Judgments - Absolute or Limited Divorce Judgments Under 247.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 27
Marq. L. Rev. 40 (1942).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol27/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

ABSOLUTE OR LIMITED DIVORCE JUDGMENTS
UNDER SECTION 247.09 OF THE
WISCONSIN STATUTES
A problem confronting divorce courts in this state almost daily
arises out of section 247.09 of the Wisconsin Statutes. It reads:
"A divorce from the bond of matrimony may also be adjudged
for either of the causes specified in the second and third subdivisions of section 247.08 whenever, in the opinion of the court,
the circumstances are such that it would be discreet and proper
so to do."
The subdivisions referred to are as follows:
"(2) Extreme cruelty of either party
(3) On the complaint of the wife, when the husband, being
of sufficient ability, shall refuse or neglect to provide for
her or when his conduct toward her is such as may
render it unsafe and improper for her to live with him."'
It is clear that the court with jurisdiction in matters of divorce have
the power under section 247.09 to grant an absolute divorce upon
grounds which are declared in section 247.08 to be cause for a limited
divorce. The question here raised is two fold: first, have the divorce
courts, under section 247.09, the power to grant an alsolute divorce
when only a limited divorce is prayed for in the complaint; secondly,
if the courts do have such power should such absolute discretion be
vested in them.
The first question finds its answer in the cases which appear to
stand as precedent in this state. As far as research herein has revealed
there are only three cases which involve this problem directly, the most
recent of which is Sang v. Sang.2 In that case the plaintiff husband
sued for a divorce from bed and board but the trial court granted an
absolute divorce to the plaintiff. Upon appeal, the plaintiff sought modification of the judgment so as to grant a limited divorce in accordance
with his complaint. While the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction over the
parties, it stated the law to be that "the trial court may grant an absolute divorce although the prayer be for one from bed and board." This
case cited In re Estate of Kehl,3 and Shequin v. Shequin4 as controlling
precedent.
In the case of In re Estate of Kehl,5 the language of the trial court
upon rendering the judgment indicated rather clearly that an absolute
STAT. (1941) 247.08(2) (3).
N.W. (2d) 340, April, 1942.
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divorce was granted though the prayer of the complaint was for a
limited divorce only. The appellants in the supreme court insisted that
it was a divorce a vinculo, the respondent that it was a limited divorce.
Upon deciding the issue, the supreme court said: "It is true that a
court may grant a divorce a vinculo although the prayer of the complaint be for one from bed and board. But the prayer of the complaint,
with nearly all judges, we believe, controls the nature of the judgment
granted by the court especially when the defendant interposes no objection, and none was interposed herein. We consider the real intention of
the court was to render a judgment in accordance with the prayer of
the complaint." While this case is clearly in line with the position taken
in Sang v. Sang6 as to the discretionary power of the court, it lends
support to the view that the prayer of the complaint should be the basis
for the judgment.
The earliest and leading case in point is Shequin v. Shequin.7 In this
case, the complaint, as amended before trial, was for a divorce a mensa
et thoro. An absolute divorce was granted, however, at the request of
the defendant who was the guilty party. The plaintiff appealed. The
supreme court said that "the mere fact that the prayer of the complaint
asked for a limited divorce did not preclude the court from granting
a divorce from the bonds when the proof warranted such a judgment."
This language upholds the statements in Sang v. Sangs and In re Estate
of Kehl.9 But it should be noted that in Shequin v. Shequin 0 it was
shown by the defendant that the plaintiff's attorneys consented to the
judgment for an absolute divorce; and the supreme court held the
plaintiff bound thereby. In Shequin v. Shequin, the court cited Dutcher
v. Dutcher" as precedent for the discretionary power of the court to
grant an absolute divorce though only a limited divorce is prayed for.
Dutcher v. Dutcher does not seem to involve this problem directly or
indirectly, nor does it discuss the statute out of which this problem
arises. The only possible language therein, it seems, which might have
been construed as relating to the question is as follows:
"It has been seen that this case was in the minds of the revisers
in New York, and influenced them in framing the divorce statute
from which section 13 in our statute is copied, and on which our
whole statute is largely modeled. And accordingly we find the
New York statute in terms permissive both as to judgments of
nullity and judgments of divorce. In our statute, the provisions
for judgments of nullity or affirmance of marriage are in terms
6Supra, note 2.
7
Supra,note 4.
8Supra, note 2.
9Supra, note 3.
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obligatory, and for judgments for divorce in terms permissive
throughout; a distinction of language in kindred sections in the
same statute pregnant with meaning.
The rule that may means shall in statutes where the public
or individuals have a claim de jure to the exercise of the power
conferred, is not overlooked. But we have the great authority of
Chancellor Kent for holding permissive words in the grant of
this peculiar jurisdiction, to imply a sound judicial discretion in
its exercise; strongly fortified here by the abrupt transition of
the statute from uniformly obligatory words in one branch of
the jurisdiction conferred, to uniformly permissive words in the
other; an antithesis precluding oversight and implying design. '' 2
While this language does not seem to justify the broad statement in
Shequin v. Shequin,1 3 the fact remains that ever since that decision the
trial courts have taken the position that they have the power to grant
an absolute divorce under section 247.09 irrespective of the prayer of
the complaint so long as the proof warrants such a judgment, and the
broad language of the cases above cited justifies this view.
As to the second question, namely, whether or not the courts should
be vested with this broad discretion, it is the opinion of the writer
that the courts should not possess this power. This opinion is based,
first, upon the statute itself; secondly, upon authorities holding that
relief granted must be in conformity with the demands of the complaint; and lastly, upon justice and sound social policy.
Under section 247.09, an absolute divorce may be granted 1) for
extreme cruelty of either party, 2) on the complaint of the wife,
when the husband, being of sufficient ability, shall refuse or neglect to
provide for her or when his conduct toward her is such as may render
it unsafe and improper for her to live with him. It must be remembered, however, that these grounds are originally grounds only for a
limited divorce under section 247.08 and they are made grounds for
an absolute divorce only by virtue of section 247.09. In other words,
in the absence of section 247.09 it would be impossible to obtain an
absolute divorce upon these grounds. It seems, therefore, that the
statute was intended to grant an adequate remedy to the complaining
party where, in the absence of the statute, such remedy would not
exist. It does not seem to have been the intention of the legislature
that this statute should be, in effect, a subdivision of section 247.08 so
as to give the courts the power to grant, in its discretion, an absolute
divorce without regard for the prayer of the litigants. Further, the
discretionary power seems to be given in this statute so that the court
may decide from the circumstances of the case whether or not a party
'1
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seeking the remedy of an absolute divorce under this statute should be
granted such remedy.
As far as actions in the courts are concerned, divorce actions are
treated the same as other cases. And in cases generally, at law or in
equity, the demands of the complaint control and limit the relief
granted by the judgment. The state of Wisconsin has so provided by
statute14 and the courts have upheld the statute in their decisions.,
It is true that this statute on the measure of relief provides that where
an answer is interposed to the complaint the court may grant the plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. 16 There is no apparent reason why this general
rule should not apply to divorce actions under section 247.09, at least
where the judgment is taken by default, when it does as a matter of
7
fact apply to other aspects of a divorce action. In Hoh v. Hoh'
the complaint in the divorce action demanded relief only as'to alimony
and temporary allowances. The trial court granted a default judgment
for a division of the husband's property. Upon appeal the judgment
of the trial court was held erroneous as granting a remedy outside the
prayer of the complaint.
The danger of vesting this power in divorce courts which are so
fundamentally vital to the proper and wholesome xirection of a sound
social policy of which marriage is in many ways the basis, is a real
one. If this power to grant an absolute divorce without at least the
consent of the parties when only a limited divorce is requested continues to exist in the courts the ends of social evils and injustice can
only be served: social evil, because divorce always affects society and
judgments for absolute divorce without regard for the desire of the
litigants seems to lead to no apparent good to society; injustice, because
this power may violate the rights of individuals who have moral convictions and reasons opposed to absolute divorce whether these convictions or reasons be religious or personal in character. Socially and in
justice, then, no litigant should be subjected to such complete judicial
discretion.
The cases cited herein were not decided solely upon the basis of
this discretionary power. In Shequin v. Shequin there was present the
consent of the plaintiff's attorneys; In re Estate of Kehl, the supreme
court was asked merely to interpret a trial court's judgment; in Sang
v. Sang, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction was the decisive element.
Nevertheless, from what has been said it is clear that the supreme court
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has stated and reiterated its position in favor of obsolute discretion
of the trial court under section 247.09, and relief, it would seem,
can come only from the legislature.
It is suggested here that section 247.09 be amended by the legislature to include the words "with the consent or at the prayer of the
complainant." With this amendment by insertion, the statute would
read in its entirety as follows:
"A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may also be adjudged
for either of the causes specified in the second and third subdivisions of section 247.08 with the consent or at the prayer of the
complainant whenever, in the opinion of the court, it would be
discreet and proper so to do."
The inserted amendment would empower the court to grant the remedy
prayed for and no other, or deny it, depending for its decree upon the
facts and circumstances of the case. Such a legislative act would remove the uncertainty and fear that litigants going into court must now
face under section 247.09 in that they can never know when a judgment for an absolute divorce granted under judicial discretion will
give them what they do not seek or desire.
ANTHONY PALASZ.

